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FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS - EXCLUSIVE DEALING - STANDARDS 
OF ILLEGALITY UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON AcT-In a re-
cent treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements, Tampa Elec. 
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,1 the Supreme Court enunciates with 
some care the standards to be applied in judging the legality of 
requirements contracts under section 3 of the Clayton Act.2 This 
1365 U.S. 820 (1961). 
2 88 Stat. 781 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). 
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comment analyzes the merits and the impact of this needed clarifi-
cation of a controversial area of antitn1st law. 
Exclusive marketing arrangements manifest themselves in vari-
ous forms, and it is not uncommon to find more than one variety 
in a given contract. This inquiry, however, will be restricted 
largely to full requirements contracts, obligating a buyer to pur-
chase from a seller all that he may require of the latter's product 
for a specified period of time, and to other exclusive dealing agree-
ments the intended effect of which is to preclude the buyer 
from dealing in merchandise that competes with the seller's 
product. 
I. 
Because in its judgment the applicable provisions of the Sher-
man Act,8 like the common law doctrines preceding them,4 failed 
to curb the injurious effects upon competition of some exclusive 
dealing arrangements, Congress in 1914 enacted section 3 of the 
Clayton Act. That section forbids certain transactions which in-
corporate a buyer's or lessee's agreement not to use or deal in the 
commodities of the seller's or lessor's competitors, but only where 
the effect thereof "may be to substantially lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."5 This quali-
fying clause has been the source of most of the interpretative diffi-
culties attending application of the statute. 
In an early case, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston 
Co.,6 the Supreme Court found section 3 to have been violated 
by exclusive dealing contracts between a manufacturer of standard 
garment patterns and its dealers where the manufacturer or its 
holding company controlled about forty percent of the 52,000 
pattern agencies in the United States. While the Court did place 
some emphasis upon the manner in which such contracts could 
be used to deny competitors access to the retail market,7 it also 
a 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1958). 
~ At common law, a bargain to deal exclusively with another was illegal if it effected, 
or formed part of a plan to effect, a monopoly. If reasonably ancillary to a main lawful 
purpose, it escaped censure. See 2 REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs §§ 514, 516 (e) (1932). 
r; This phrase was inserted "because of an apparent realization that some legitimate 
business considerations might justify certain forms of exclusive dealing .••• " Arr'Y GEN. 
NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUsr REP. 138 (1955). 
6 258 U.S. 346 (1922). Compare Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 
U.S. 457 (1941). 
7 The Court quoted with approval from the opinion of the court below: "'The 
restriction of each merchant to one pattern manufacturer must in hundreds, perhaps in 
thousands, of small communities amount to giving such single pattern manufacturer a 
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implied that the inference of lessened competition or tendency 
toward monopoly was supportable by a bare finding that the seller 
in question dominated the market.8 The Standard Fashion opin-
ion thus created issues which have characterized this area ever 
since. What is the required scope of market analysis? Is denial of 
market access a necessary concomitant of the parties' observance 
of exclusive dealing contracts? Does the use of such contracts by 
a seller in a dominant market position automatically produce a 
section 3 violation? 
The issue of prime importance, to which these questions are all 
related, has been, and probably will continue to be, the standard 
of proof to be applied. In early court cases, and generally in Fed-
eral Trade Commission proceedings, there exists a willingness to 
judge exclusive dealing contracts on a comparative standard per-
mitting the substantiality of a denial of market access to be weighed 
in terms of its relation to the pattern of competition in the line of 
commerce involved.9 More recently, however, the standards of 
analysis tend to reflect the influence of the quantitative test estab-
lished for "tying" contracts by International Salt Co. v. United 
States.10 There it was held that coverage by patent tying clauses 
of a not insignificant volume of commerce was sufficient basis from 
which to infer a lessening of competition or tendency toward 
monopoly. 
But the economic realities which perhaps dictate the appro-
priateness of this "quantitative substantiality" test11 for tying con-
monopoly of the business in such community. Even in the larger cities, to limit to a 
single pattern maker the pattern business of dealers most resorted to by customers whose 
purchases tend to give fashions their vogue, may tend to facilitate further combinations; 
so that the plaintiff, or some other aggressive concern, instead of controlling two-fifths, 
will shortly have almost, if not quite, all the pattern business.'" 258 U.S. at 357. 
s But see HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 32-33 (1957): "Under this reading, per 
se invalidity would attach to the use of exclusives by any dominant seller .••• [But], 
as a matter of authority, the case in no wise holds that the existence of dominant power 
automatically results in a Section 3 violation.'' 
9 E.g., Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), afj'd per 
curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936); United States v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. 
Ill. 1949); Revlon Prods. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954); Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1954). The 
FTC has jurisdiction in § 3 cases by virtue of § 11 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1126 (1950), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. II, 1960). 
10 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Leases of patented machines on condition that lessees purchase 
from lessor all unpatented salt consumed in them were held on summary judgment to be 
a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act. For sample definitions 
of tying and exclusive contracts, see Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945). 
llThis term denotes a standard of illegality which depends solely upon the amount 
of goods or dollar volume involved, considered in absolute terms. This test should be 
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tracts are not necessarily characteristic of other types of exclusive 
dealing agreements. While most tying contracts are justifiably 
thought to be inherently anticompetitive in nature, since they 
"serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion,"12 other exclusive arrangements, and especially requirements 
contracts, can promote as well as restrain competition.13 There-
fore, while a finding of great market leverage or of coverage of a 
substantial amount of business may entitle a court to take the 
experientially-justified shortcut to the conclusion that a tying con-
tract will necessarily lessen competition or tend toward monopoly, 
such simplicity of inference is generally ill-suited to other types of 
exclusive dealing agreements. The fact that exclusive sales con-
tracts can at times be consistent with antitrust objectives indicates 
that further analysis of market structure and behavior will usually 
be necessary. Yet Standard Oil Co. v. United States,14 heretofore 
the most important application of section 3 to requirements con-
tracts, lends some support to use of the quantitative approach. 
II. 
At issue in the Standard Stations case were approximately 8,000 
exclusive contracts between Standard and 5,937 independent retail 
outlets, by the terms of which the retailers agreed to take from 
Standard all their requirements of one or more products, chiefly 
gasoline, either for a specified term or from year to year. The 
contracts covered 16 percent of the independent outlets in the 
relevant market area, comprised of seven western states, and in-
distinguished from the "substantial share of commerce" test which is based upon the pro-
portion of the market which the amount of commerce in question bears to the market as 
a whole. Compare International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), with 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 241 (1949). 
Since the Standard Stations decision, exclusive dealing controversy has often taken the form 
of "quantitative substantiality versus rule of reason inquiry," with the understanding that 
these terms signify general approaches rather than technical niceties. However, the same 
generality that makes these phrases convenient only serves to introduce confusion into any 
attempt to distinguish among their more limited applications. See note 17 infra and text 
accompanying note 18 infra. 
12 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); accord, Black v. 
Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24 (1957). 
13 Exclusive arrangements can bolster weak competitors and facilitate entry into the 
market. For parties to requirements contracts, positive values include enhanced certainty 
and ability to plan in a fluctuating market, lower costs, and assured supply. See KAYSEN 8: 
TURNER, ANTITRusr POLICY, AN EcONO!IUC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 159 (1959); Stockhausen, 
The Commercial and Antitrust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L. 
R.Ev. 412 (1948). 
14 337 U.S. 293 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as Standard Stations]. 
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volved the purchase of more than $57,600,000 worth of gasoline, 
or 6. 7 percent of the total gallonage in that area, as well as 2 per-
cent of tire and battery sales. While not as a matter of law in a 
position of dominance, Standard was nevertheless the market lead-
er; its total gasoline sales in 1946 constituted 23 percent of the 
taxable gallonage in the western area. Standard's six leading com-
petitors, who also utilized exclusive dealing arrangements, ab-
sorbed 42.5 percent of the total taxable gallonage, and the remain-
der was divided among more than seventy small companies. 
The district court expressly declined to hold the contracts 
illegal per se, and allowed many comparative statistics to go into 
the record as relevant to the determination of unreasonableness of 
restraint under the Sherman Act and substantiality of restraint or 
tendency to create monopoly under the Clayton Act. However, 
the court held that "substantiality of restraint or tendency to create 
monopoly is established by (a) the market foreclosed, -here rep-
resented by the controlled units, - and (b) the volume of con-
trolled business" and that "there is illegal restraint here under 
both Acts, whether the commerce be considered quantitatively or 
comparatively. "Hi 
The issue before the Supreme Court, as framed by Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, was whether the qualifying clause of section 3 could 
be satisfied simply by proof that the requirements contracts affected 
a substantial portion of commerce or whether it was necessary to 
show that competitive activity did or probably would diminish. 
The Court held "that the qualifying clause of § 3 is satisfied by 
proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share 
of the line of commerce affected."16 In so concluding, the Court 
appears to have rejected the applicability of the quantitative sub-
staptiality test. Mr. Justice Frankfurter explicitly refused to regard 
the International Salt decision as dispositive of the case because 
of the economic differences between tying and requirements con-
tracts which make the latter less obviously detrimental to competi-
tion and render quantitative substantiality alone a weaker founda-
tion for the inference that competition may be lessened by 
requirements contracts.17 To accept this distinction, the Justice 
15 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850, 872 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 337 
U.S. 293 (1949). 
16 337 U.S. at 314. 
17 See note 13 supra. In general, tying clauses are unreasonable per se under the 
Sherman Act whenever the defendant has sufficient market power in the tying product 
to restrain competition appreciably for the tied product and·a "not insubstantial" amount 
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continued, is to make relevant further economic tests, toward 
which some of Standard's evidence was addressed. The implica-
tion seems to be that in a normal case direct proof of actual or 
probable diminution of competition would be necessary to find a 
section 3 violation, and that the cases must be considered with 
regard to the particular market settings involved. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the Court, in section 3 cases, will not indulge 
in that broad market analysis appropriate to most Sherman Act 
trade restraint cases.18 "It seems hardly likely that, having with 
one hand set up an express prohibition against a practice thought 
to be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, Congress meant, with 
the other hand, to reestablish the necessity of meeting the same 
tests of detriment to the public interest as that act had been inter-
preted as requiring.''19 
For the cause before him, Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears to 
have settled upon a standard of proof requiring less market analysis 
than that contended for by Standard and more than that used by 
the court below. In his judgment, the circumstances of the case 
relieved the Court of any obligation to consider Standard's evi-
dence pertaining to actual increase or decrease in the number of 
its competitors and their dealers because, even granting the com-
parison sought to be established, a court would be unable to con-
clude with certainty whether competition had or probably would 
be substantially lessened as a result of the contracts. Two factors 
of commerce is affected. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The 
presence of either of the above factors will render a tying clause illegal under § 3 of the 
Clayton Act. And if the clause transgresses either under the Sherman Act or the Clayton 
Act, it is a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1958). See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 
!145 U.S. 594, 608 (1953); United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105, 
112 (N.D. Ill. 1956). The requisite market power can be inferred from sales leadership 
or even from the desirability of the tying product to the buyer. United States v. Jerrold 
Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), 
Note, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961). 
18 In deciding whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act, "the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature 
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (per Mr. Justice Brandeis). Accord, United States v. Columbia Steel 
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 5Zl (1948). 
10 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 312 (1949). See Antitrust Law 
Symposium, 1959 N.Y.S.B.A. SECTION ON ANTITRUST I.Aw 105 n.105, to the effect that 
factors properly considered under § I of the Sherman Act are also relevant to the ques-
tion whether an incipient violation exists under § 3 of the Clayton Act. 
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were emphasized in justification of this view. First, exclusive deal-
ing was an industry practice, and may have enabled the major sup-
pliers at least to maintain shares of the market which would other-
wise have been smaller. Second, other marketing devices, equally 
capable of restricting competition, were readily available to these 
suppliers. Agency contracts and vertical integration were obvious 
alternatives. Hence the standard of proof for which Standard 
argued was virtually impossible to meet, directed as it was toward 
what might have happened or what would happen to the market 
but for the contracts in issue. 
It seems a fair interpretation to say that the Court felt, not 
that it was ill-equipped to undertake extensive market analysis,20 
or even that such analysis was inappropriate in the usual section 3 
case, but rather that it would prove futile in this particular litiga-
tion. Ordinarily, such a finding would necessitate holding that 
the Government had not met its burden of proof, for it is a long 
step from the proposition that Standard could not show that com-
petition was not lessened to the conclusion that an actual or prob-
able lessening of competition had been established. Yet this con-
clusion was nevertheless drawn. It is the nature of this more limited 
standard of proof and the factors which will trigger its invocation 
with which this comment is concerned. 
In holding against Standard, the Court apparently found fac-
tual justification in the substantiality of the amounts compre-
hended, the number of retail outlets involved, the percentage of 
the relevant market covered by the contracts, Standard's position 
as the sales leader, the fact that its largest competitors also engaged 
in exclusive dealing, and its great bargaining power relative to the 
retailers with whom it dealt.21 If, as the Standard Fashion case 
20 Although the opinion states that the test offered by Standard Oil "would be a 
standard of proof, if not virtually impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascer-
tainment by courts," 337 U.S. at 310, it is not likely that the Court would profess a loss, 
in § 3 cases, of that ability which it so obviously exercises under the Sherman Act. A 
reasonable explanation would appear to be that the Court viewed Standard's argument as 
one which would not be meritorious under either act, in view of the circumstances of the 
case. The possible validity of the alternative interpretation -that Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
employed a fallacious argument to preclude the use of extended market analysis in ~ 3 
cases - must be admitted. However, it is possible to reconcile his position with subsequent 
and less stringent pronouncements of the Court, which lend hindsight support to the 
more charitable view, and that is attempted here. But see Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust 
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 
1162 (1952). 
21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attention to market structure and competitive patterns 
may have been more extensive than it initially appeared. See his dissenting opinion in 
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401-02 (1953), where Standard 
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may be said to have held, dominance coupled with exclusive cov-
erage of a substantial share of commerce is sufficient ground for 
inferring a lessening of competition, it extends the principle but 
little to say that Standard's status, because of the peculiar pattern 
of competition in this market, was the legal equivalent of market 
dominance. While the inevitability of the result escapes many, 
the Court has apparently subscribed to the view that there is a 
connection between great market power and the likelihood of 
foreclosure of competitive activity which obviates the necessity of 
making an extended market analysis when a substantial22 share 
of the relevant market has been tied up through exclusive dealing 
agreements. This emphasis in Standard Stations led courts in a 
number of cases thereafter decided to proclaim a per se rule in 
applying the statute.23 
Apparently "foreclosure" is thought to be an inevitable result 
of the mere observance of the contracts by the parties to them, 
since adherence by a buyer automatically removes him for the 
length of the contract from the group of such buyers to whom 
competitors of the supplier may sell. But whether foreclosure of 
competition is an actual or likely result of contract observance 
should depend entirely upon what market is considered relevant.24 
If, as was held in Standard Stations, the arena of competition 
among suppliers is the independent retail dealer market, contracts 
Stations was discussed in terms of such factors as public interest, the bargaining power of 
the seller vis-a-vis the retailer, and the importance of the relevant product to the retailer's 
total business. 
22 The percentage must be more than de minimis, but, in view of the 2% and 6.7% 
figures found in Standard Stations, it need not be great. It should be noted that the 
statute is aimed at the probability, not the mere possibility, that competition will be 
substantially lessened. Compare B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed. 720 (7th Cir. 
1923) (1% coverage not a violation). There is, of course, the possibility that the Court 
will lower its standard of substantiality as other restrictive elements appear. This would 
be in keeping with the objective of reaching incipient violations. 
23Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum); Dictograph 
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954) (dictum), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 
(1955); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afj'd per 
curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (on basis of Standard Stations). Compare Signode Steel 
Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault &: 
Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936). Cf. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 
206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). 
24 Some criticism has been leveled at the majority in Standard Stations for failing to 
consider alternative marketing channels. E.g., HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 36 
(1957). Compare Lockhart &: Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining 
Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REv. 
913, 919, 935 (1952). Such criticism appears to involve the prejudgment that the area of 
effective competition was some market other than the one found by the Court to be 
relevant. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299-300, 300 n.5 (1949). 
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with a certain percentage of the dealers handling a certain share of 
commerce in a particular commodity25 ,;\Till deny to competitors 
of the contracting supplier access to that much of the relevant 
market. To that extent the opportunity of suppliers to compete 
for the business of the retailers is foreclosed. Even if the competi-
tors develop new markets, competition for the pre-empted share 
,;\Till have been suppressed, and if that share is substantial, section 
3 may be said to have been violated. On the other hand, if the 
Court in Standard Stations had found that competition among the 
suppliers was in actuality for the purchase dollars of automobile 
owners, and that the retailers were "only a conduit from the oil 
fields to the driver's tank, a means by which the oil companies 
compete to get the business of the ultimate consumer" and "the 
instrumentalities through which competition for this ultimate 
market is waged,"26 exclusive contracts binding a certain share of 
the retail dealers would not necessarily result in a lessening of 
competition. At least that conclusion could not be drawn without 
further analysis of the actual or probable effects of the contracts, 
for at the making of the contracts the ultimate consumers will not 
yet have committed themselves to buy from particular retailers. 
As will appear, Tampa Electric does not suggest a diminution 
of the Court's hostility toward dominant users' employment of 
exclusive dealing contracts. Rather, it clarifies by indirection such 
cases as Standard Stations while underlining the necessity for more 
extensive market analysis where the exclusive dealing supplier does 
but a small share of the business in the relevant market. 
III. 
The Tampa Electric case presented for the Court's considera-
tion a requirements contract by which defendant coal company 
agreed to sell to plaintiff, a Florida utility company, substan-
tially all the coal which the latter would require to operate the 
first two units of a new generating station for a period of twenty 
25 In a § 3 case, the court must determine the relevant market area. Tampa Elec. 
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 
U.S. 218, 226 (1947). Also of importance is the determination of the relevant product or 
line of commerce. Whether substitute products will be included may depend upon "cross-
elasticity of demand." Compare United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 
377 (1956), with International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1959), 
and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953). 
26 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949) (dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Jackson). 
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years. Before any coal was delivered, defendant advised plaintiff 
that it would not perform since it regarded the contract as illegal 
under the antitrust laws. In plaintiff's action to have the contract 
declared valid, the district court27 granted the coal company's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed 
facts showed a substantial lessening of competition in violation of 
section 3 of the Clayton Act. Primary emphasis was placed upon 
the fact that the estimated coal tonnage, competition for which was 
foreclosed by the contract, exceeded the previous annual consump-
tion of all of peninsular Florida, and also upon the fact that the 
contract value of the coal covered by the twenty-year term -
$128,000,000 - was not "insignificant or insubstantial." 
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, Justices Black and Douglas 
dissenting, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts 
below had not properly considered the controlling factor of "rele-
vant market." The relevant market, said Mr. Justice Clark, was 
the area of effective competition between defendant and the other 
700 coal producers to whom Tampa Electric could have turned for 
its supply. The Court concluded from its consideration of certain 
statistics that even with pre-emption to the extent of maximum 
anticipated total requirements, Tampa Electric's share of the rele-
vant coal product would be less than one percent. Noting that dollar 
volume alone is not the proper test, the Court held that pre-emp-
tion of competition to the extent of the tonnage involved did not 
tend to foreclose competition substantially. The supplier's market 
position was not inherently anticompetitive, as was the case in 
Standard Fashion, Standard Stations and International Salt, and 
only a small share of the relevant market was affected. Also stressed 
were the mutually advantageous nature of the contract and the 
public interest in the availability to a utility company of an assured 
and ample fuel supply. 
In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice Clark took advantage 
of the opportunity to elaborate upon the tests to be applied in 
cases such as the one before him. As threshold questions, he 
noted, a court must determine whether the contract involved is 
in fact an exclusive dealing arrangement; what line of commerce 
is involved; and the relevant market area. In order to hold section 
3 violated, the court must further find (1) that there has been or 
27168 F. Supp. 456 (D.C. Tenn. 1958), afj'd, 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960), 46 VA. L. 
REv. 1463 (1960), 60 CoLuM. L. REv. 1188 (1960). 
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probably will be a "foreclosure of competition" - presumably con-
sisting of denial of market access; (2) that such foreclosure occurs 
in the relevant market area; and (3) that the competition fore-
closed constitutes a substantial share of the relevant market. 
Perhaps the most important feature of the opinion is its em-
phasis upon market analysis and the necessity for weighing various 
factors in their competitive setting before arriving at a decision 
in a given case. It is the Court's position that in determining 
whether there is or probably will be a substantial foreclosure of 
competition such as will violate section 3, the probable effect of 
the contract upon the relevant market should be weighed. Con-
sideration should be given to: (I) the relative strength of the 
parties to the contract; (2) the duration of the contract, including 
such particularized considerations of the businesses involved as 
may be relevant thereto;28 (3) the percentage of commerce in the 
relevant market that is involved; and ( 4) the probable effects, both 
immediate and future, of a pre-emption of that percentage upon 
effective competition in the relevant market. 
While undertaking its first notable elaboration of the fore-
closure concept, however, the Court leaves several questions in 
need of clarification. Among these is the weight to be assigned to 
a determination of the relative strength of the contracting parties. 
While legislative history gives some indication that section 3 was 
intended to mitigate the coercive effects of an inequality of bargain-
ing power between the contracting parties,29 it is arguable that the 
28 Considerations of motive should be distinguished, since they are irrelevant in a 
§ 3 case. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 (1955); DIRLAM & KAHN, FAIR 
COMPETITION: THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 45 (1954). Under § 3, 
the weight of "particularized considerations of the parties' operations" is far less than 
under the Sherman Act, or under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, where "the 
point where a method of competition becomes 'unfair' ••• will often turn on the exigen• 
cies of a particular situation, trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business 
in question.'' FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953) 
(per Mr. Justice Douglas). 
29E.g., H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13 (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 9072, 9083, 
9160-61, 9407-08, 14270 (1914). See Beloit Culligan Soft Water Serv., Inc. v. Culligan, 
Inc., 274 F.2d 29, 35 (7th Cir. 1959); Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. 1197, 1205 (1955) (dissenting 
opinion of Commissioner Mead). But see Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-
Wide Auto Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 423 (D.N.J. 1960). It has been held that the plain 
language of § 3 precludes resort to legislative history for its interpretation. Standard 
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); Anchor Serum Co. v. ITC, 217 
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). That language clearly permits coercion to be considered in 
determining whether an exclusive dealing arrangement has in fact been made, but 
whether § 3's protection embraces the competitive opportunities of the buyer or lessee is 
not clear. If the buyer's ability to compete, presumably in a different relevant market, 
is somehow impaired by his exclusive contract with the supplier, coercion might become 
relevant, although still not controlling. However, this is a different issue entirely, and it 
should be treated separately in the cases, if at all. 
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language of the statute protects competitors of the seller or lessor 
while preserving only indirectly the exercise of independent choice 
by customers. If this interpretation is correct, then neither the 
result nor the nature of the standard of proof should be deter-
mined by the presence or absence of coercive elements in the 
contract relationship, for the buyer or lessee surrenders his right 
to choose among competing suppliers for the contract's duration 
whether or not he has been forced to accede to the exclusive deal-
ing provision. In this sense, at least, relative bargaining power 
of the contracting parties is irrelevant to the issue of foreclosure 
of competition. 
On the other hand, concentration of economic power in a 
supplier vis-a-vis competing suppliers may have some bearing on 
the foreclosure question, since in the absence of direct evidence 
to the contrary, and barring unusual patterns of competition, it 
points to the increased probability that the supplier's exclusive 
dealing agreements will lessen competition or tend toward mono-
poly. Yet the Court, while reaffirming the vitality of Standard 
Fashion and Standard Stations, has once again provided a mini-
mum of enlightenment upon the relationship between dominant 
market power and the standard of proof needed to satisfy section 
3's qualifying clause. Mr. Justice Clark states the teaching of the 
Standard Fashion case and United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United 
States3° to be "that a finding of domination of the relevant market 
by the lessor or seller was sufficient to support the inference that 
competition had or would be substantially lessened by the con-
tracts involved there," but observes that some heed was given to 
"the practical effect" of the contracts.31 Similarly, he interprets 
Standard Stations as holding that requirements contracts "are 
proscribed by § 3 if their practical effect is to prevent lessees or 
purchasers from dealing in the goods, etc., of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller and thereby 'competition has been 
foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.' " 
Later, however, he states that the combination of the large num-
ber of gasoline stations, the large number of contracts and the great 
volume of products involved "dictated a finding that 'Standard's 
use of the contracts [ created] just such a potential clog on com-
petition as it was the purpose of § 3 to remove' where, as there, 
30 258 U.S. 451 (1922). 
31 !165 U.S. at !126. 
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the affected proportion of retail sales was substantial."32 Doubt 
thus remains to cloud the evidentiary issue. 
But in carefully distinguishing the Tampa Electric contract 
from those made by suppliers wielding disproportionate market 
power, the Court further elucidates its position on this issue and 
offers a clue to the proper reading of Standard Stations:33 
"There is here neither a seller ·with a dominant position 
in the market as in Standard Fashions . .. nor myriad outlets 
with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry-wide 
practice of relying upon exclusive contracts, as in Standard 
Oil . .. nor a plainly restrictive tying arrangement as in In-
ternational Salt. . . . On the contrary, we seem to have only 
that type of contract which "may well be of economic ad-
vantage to buyers as well as to sellers."34 
The flavor of the opinion taken as a whole suggests the con-
clusion that the Court will enlarge or restrict the scope of the 
standard of proof. from case to case, depending upon the presence 
or absence of certain evidentiary factors. Where the supplier 
occupies a position of market dominance or its equivalent, a hold-
ing of illegality may be predicated upon proof that a substantial 
percentage of the relevant market in the line of commerce involved 
has been pre-empted by exclusive dealing arrangements. Where 
the supplier does not have such market control, no violation of 
section 3 will be found in the absence of further evidence showing 
actual or probable substantial diminution of competition in the 
relevant market for the line of commerce involved. 
The division between these varying applications of the statu-
tory standard may in actuality be less sharply-defined, however. 
Something less than dominant market power is likely to be its 
equivalent in legal effect. In the light of Standard Stations, this 
category will no doubt include leadership of a dominant group of 
suppliers, the other members of which also deal exclusively. The 
inclusion seems appropriate, for the potential detriment to small 
32 Id. at 329. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice Frankfurter's silent participation in the 
majority opinion should be noted. 
33 For various interpretations of the Standard Stations case, see KAYSEN &: TURNER, 
op. cit. supra note 13, at 147, 160; HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 24, at 33-37; DIRLAM &: 
KAHN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 93-94, 100; McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" 
Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 45 ILL. L. 
REv. 141, 161-65 (1950); Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition -Impact of 
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on Standard of Legality Under Clayton 
Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. IO (1949). 
34 365 U.S. at 334. 
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competitors is substantially similar whether one firm or a handful 
employ the restrictive devices. Even here, evidentiary considera-
tions might vary, depending upon the number of the major sup-
pliers using exclusive dealing contracts, although conservative 
counseling will point out the high antitrust risk attending any 
major's extensive use of such practices. 
An exception to the dominance rule might apply where a short 
term requirements contract is the "appropriate unit of sale"35 in 
the industry-that is, where requirements contracts are the prevail-
ing mode of sale and where, in view of the line of commerce and 
the market structure, such a manner of dealing is appropriate or 
necessary. An exception of this kind could be asserted with some 
force on behalf of utility companies, for example, since their 
private necessities in this regard are reinforced by a public duty. 
Regardless of the appropriateness of requirements contracts for 
the industry concerned, the duration of the contract should be 
considered for its effect upon the substantiality of the foreclosure, 
since the shorter the term of the contract, the less obvious are its 
detrimental effects upon competition.36 
Similarly, dominance should be controlling only when re-
lated to the relevant line of commerce. If Standard Oil, for 
example, had contracted exclusively with regard to an accessory 
over which another supplier maintained a virtual monopoly, com-
petition might thereby have been promoted rather than sup-
pressed. In such a case it would be unrealistic to say that Stand-
ard's market power over gasoline sales automatically narrowed the 
standard of proof required to show a lessening of competition in 
the relevant market for the accessory.37 
In short, "dominance" must not become an epithet ·with which 
to condemn exclusive dealing arrangements as though they existed 
in vacuo. To be legally operative, dominance must relate to 
effective competition in a relevant consuming market, in a relevant 
market area, for the appropriate line of commerce. Its effects may 
35 See KAYsEN &: TURNER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 147, 160. 
30 To the effect that requirements contracts limited to a duration of one year need 
not be unreasonable restraints of trade or unfair methods of competition, see FTC v. 
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953); United States v. Linde Air 
Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (dictum); United States v. American Can 
Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Del. 1949) (dictum). 
37 See Excelsior Motor Mfg. &: Supply Co. v. Sound Equip., Inc., 73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 
1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 706 (1935). There the supplier's exclusive dealing arrange-
ment would have operated in a market over which a competitor exercised monopoly power. 
The court noted that the effect of the arrangement would have been to introduce, rather 
than lessen, competition. 
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vary with the pattern of competition, the duration of the contract, 
public interest, and the substantiality of the denial of market access 
to competitors. 
Finally, it should be noted that although the scope of market 
analysis is certain to be affected by the nature of the standard of 
proof applied in a given case, the concepts are not so intimately 
related as to be completely interdependent. Thus while the 
actual effects of a dominant supplier's exclusive contracts need not 
be proved, evidence thereof will often be pertinent to such im-
portant issues as "relevant market" and "substantiality of fore-
closure." In this regard, the impact of Tampa Electric upon the 
lower federal courts is likely to be considerable. By restricting 
the quantitative substantiality doctrine to tying contract cases and 
by limiting the applicability of the Standard Stations opinion, the 
Court has practically insured, and properly so, the future utiliza-
tion of a more extensive factual inquiry than the courts have lately 
exhibited a willingness to undertake. 
IV. 
The probable impact of Tampa Electric upon the Federal 
Trade Commission's approach to exclusive dealing is more difficult 
to predict. At one time, this approach was characterized by an 
emphasis, in contested cases, upon the necessity for shO"wing an 
actual or probable lessening of competition beyond considerations 
of market power and quantitative substantiality. 
For example, in Maico Co.,38 a case involving a manufacturer 
of hearing aid instruments and other products, the examiner 
found a violation on the basis of respondent's rank in the field, its 
volume of business, and the number of exclusive contracts it had 
with distributors. He rejected evidence introduced by respondent 
to show an increase in competition, a decrease in its 01vn share of 
the market, the small percentage of dealers it actually had under 
contract, and other matters of like import. The Commission, be-
lieving these unconsidered factors bore materially on the question 
whether there was or might be a substantial lessening of competi-
tion, remanded the matter to the examiner "for the development 
of a record sufficient to enable us to determine the effect of 
respondent's practices on competition."39 
ss 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953). 
39 Id. at 488. See also Revlon Prods. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260, 276 (1954) (FTC declines 
to restrict its consideration to quantitative substantiality). Compare the Commission's 
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Until recently, FTC approval of a less inclusive standard of 
proof has been virtually nonexistent, although this is perhaps due 
to the fact that actual exclusion of competitors has usually been 
affirmatively demonstrated even in those cases where a more 
restricted inquiry would have sufficed to prove a violation.40 
In two such cases, Dictograph Prods., Inc.41 and Anchor Serum 
Co.,42 affirmance by the reviewing courts was couched in language 
expressing approval of a narrower approach. This did not accord 
with the Commission's position, judging from the view expressed 
in Maico that the FTC, because of its expertise, should consider 
evidence of actual effect on competition even though it under-
stood Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Standard Stations to have found 
courts ill-equipped for the task.43 
In so indicating that it might require a greater showing of 
anticompetitive market effects even where dominance and other 
restrictive factors would, in a federal court, relieve the Govern-
ment of that burden, the Commission assumed a position incon-
sistent with the idea that the evidentiary criteria of illegality in 
section 3 cases should not vary with the tribunal involved.44 Dual 
enforcement of the statute need not, and should not, dictate dual 
standards of legality. 
More recently, however, the Commission has retreated from 
its Maico stand to a position substantially in harmony with Tampa 
Electric's view of Standard Stations and related cases. In Mytinger 
& Casselberry, Inc.,45 where the Commission held illegal respond-
ent's exclusive dealing contracts ·with 80,700 distributors of its 
vitamin and mineral supplements, covering from 8.6 percent to 
61.52 percent of three relevant markets, the Commission observed: 
approach to tying cases in Insto-Gas Corp., 51 F.T.C. 363 (1954). Cf. Pillsbury Mills, 
50 F.T.C. 555 (1954) (under § 7 of the Clayton Act). 
40 E.g., Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1066 (1954). 
4150 F.T.C. 281 (1953), afj'd, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954). 
42 50 F.T.C. 681, afj'd, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). 
43 50 F.T.C. at 488. This view somewhat overgeneralizes the Justice's opinion which 
should have been read in the light of the evidence offered by Standard in that case and 
the particular pattern of competition involved there. See note 20 supra. But see An'Y 
GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 n.77 (1955): "We do not read the Federal Trade 
Commission's opinion in the Maico case • • • as launching that agency into economic 
investigations beyond the inquiry authorized by the governing interpretations of Section 3 
that bind courts and the Commission alike." 
44 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949); An'Y GEN. 
NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 (1955). 
45 F.T.C. Docket 6962, September 28, 1960. 
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"Respondents introduced certain economic data as jus-
tification for the use of their exclusive dealing arrangements. 
It is true ... that in the Maico case, the Commission issued an 
order remanding the matter to the hearing examiner for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence as to the economic effect of the 
exclusive dealing agreements used by that company .... How-
ever, since the date of the Commission's action in the Maico 
case, the courts have made it clear that in a situation such as 
that shown to exist in this record, the plain language of Sec-
tion 3 makes irrelevant those economic considerations urged 
by respondents."46 
Similarly, in Timken Roller Bearing Co.,47 the Commission 
struck down respondent's exclusive dealing contracts covering over 
7,500 marketing outlets for the sale of tapered roller bearings in 
the replacement market for that product. A probable substantial 
lessening of competition was held to be fully established, in the 
light of Standard Stations, Dictograph and Anchor Serum, by 
evidence demonstrating that respondent was by far the leading 
supplier in the replacement market:48 and that its exclusive dealing 
contracts affected a substantial share of the market. 
In narrowing the scope of required market inquiry, the Com-
mission has not only recognized that the validity of such an approach 
is not restricted to the courts, but also it has gone farther and ap-
plied the criteria invoked in Standard Stations to situations in-
volving market leadership unaccompanied by other important 
indicia of dominant power. Whether the Supreme Court would 
be willing to go so far is doubtful in view of the limitations the 
Court has already placed upon the applicability o,f the more 
quantitative test. It is by no means obvious that market leader-
ship, without more, is sufficient to establish a clear probability that 
competition will be substantially lessened by the leader's extensive 
use of exclusive dealing contracts. Therefore, a closer look at 
market effects would appear to be warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary effect of the Tampa Electric opinion is likely to 
be a greater emphasis, by the courts and perhaps by the Federal 
46Jd. at 3. 
47 F.T.C. Docket 6504, January 24, 1961. 
48 Timken's dollar volume was roughly ten times that of its nearest competitor; it had 
over fourteen times the number of different items in its roller bearing line; and it had 
almost four times as many customers. Id. at 14-15. 
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Trade Commission, upon qualitative factors in section 3 exclusive 
dealing cases involving non-dominant suppliers. At the same 
time, Standard Stations has been paired with the dominant-sup-
plier cases in such a manner as to reaffirm the applicability of a 
less searching, although not entirely quantitative, standard of 
proof where the existence of special market power and certain 
other structural and behavioral circumstances increases-to an as 
yet not clearly-defined degree-the probability of anticompetitive 
consequences. 
While Tampa Electric does not remove all obstacles to under-
standing, it would be unreasonable to expect the Court to employ 
a relatively clear-cut case as a vehicle for the anticipatory resolu-
tion of every marginal issue likely to arise in this area of "not in-
substantial" complexity. The antitrust aspects of exclusive deal-
ing are significantly illuminated by what the opinion does say and 
its shortcomings as a definitive work should not render it less 
welcome. 
Judd L. Bacon, S. Ed. 
